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If human rights are “inalienable rights of all members of the human family”, as is enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, then no government should be allowed to deny people of them. When some
governments fail to realize them for the people under their jurisdiction, the international community has a
responsibility to step in.
This extra-territorial effect of human rights was not included in the original conception of human rights. It is of
recent date, and, in practice, limited to interventions to end severe violations of civil and political human rights.
For economic, social and cultural human rights, extra-territorial obligations are still contested.
In this paper, we elaborate three contentions: first, that the realization of social human rights requires the acceptance
of and compliance with extra-territorial obligations; second, that compliance with extra-territorial obligations
would help transform the international assistance paradigm from charity into legal obligation; and third, that for
global constitutionalism to succeed in improving the fairness of the international legal order requires acceptance
of the indivisibility of human rights.
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If human rights are “inalienable rights of all members of
the human family”, as enshrined in the Universal Declar-
ation of Human Rights (UDHR) [1], then no government
should be allowed to deny people of them – whether the
denial is due to the inability or the unwillingness of
some governments to realize all human rights for all
people under their jurisdiction. If, for practical and histor-
ical reasons, it made sense to assign the duties corre-
sponding with human rights primarily to the government
that rules the territory where the people concerned live,
this assignment or designation cannot be exclusive. If the* Correspondence: gooms@itg.be
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article, unless otherwise stated.designation of corresponding duties were exclusive, then
the realization of human rights would depend entirely on
the discretionary willingness or the fortuitous ability of
state governments – and that would make human rights
very alienable indeed. In the words of Shue: “where the
state with the primary duty to protect rights fails – for
lack of will or capacity – to fulfill its duty, some other
agent at least sometimes must step in and provide the
missing protection”, [2] pages 176–177.
The original conception of human rights did not in-
clude such ‘extra-territorial’ responsibility. The (French)
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 –
considered by Cohen as the “progenitor and referent of
modern human rights discourses” [3], page 166 – was,
as its title suggests, a declaration about the rights of the
citizens of France. While the text may suggest that all
human beings ought to enjoy the rights mentioned in
the declaration, it does not suggest that the people ofed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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or that France should promote these rights elsewhere:
these are citizens’ rights – rights one has by virtue of be-
ing a citizen of a society that embraced them – rather than
human rights.
According to Cohen, a “second wave of human rights
discourse and treaty-making” was marked by “the invoca-
tion of internationally and regionally articulated human
rights agreements by local activists” [3], pages 168–169: a
passive form of extraterritorial responsibility for human
rights. By passive, we mean that the international commu-
nity set human rights standards for all countries, but re-
lied on activism at the national level claiming their
realization, and ultimately on governments to fulfil them
at the national level. Cohen situates the UDHR at the end
of the ‘first wave’ of human rights discourse – because it
seems to confirm national sovereignty unconditionally –
whereas we would consider the UDHR as the starting
point of the ‘second wave’ – a retroactive rejection of the
abuses of sovereignty during World War Two, setting
standards for all countries – we can agree that human
rights discourse took an important turn. Importantly,
international legal scholars broadly agree that the UDHR
now forms part of customary international law, and al-
though not a legally binding treaty it establishes univer-
sal standards to be upheld and realized for all [4]. Under
the ‘second wave’, human rights are no longer perceived
as rights that some people can claim from their govern-
ments – depending on whether their governments de-
cide to embrace them, or not; they have become rights
that all people can legitimately claim from their govern-
ments – whether governments embrace them or not.
But under the ‘second wave’ the responsibility to realize
human rights still rests at the national level.
Cohen argues that a ‘third wave’ of human rights dis-
course started when human rights were “invoked as jus-
tification for the imposition of debilitating sanctions,
military invasions, and authoritarian occupation admin-
istrations by multilateral organizations (NATO, UNSC)
and/or states acting unilaterally under the rubric of
“humanitarian” and even “democratic” intervention” [3],
page 172. This is what we would call an active form of
extraterritorial responsibility for human rights: when
governments fail to realize them, the international com-
munity has a responsibility to step in.
The so-called ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) doctrine,
embraced by limited elements of the international com-
munity in recent years [5], can be seen as the spearhead
of the third wave of human rights. The R2P doctrine is
summarized by Bellamy as resting “on three equally
weighted and nonsequential pillars:
(1) the primary responsibility of states to protect their
own populations from the four crimes of genocide,war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity, as well as from their incitement;
(2) the international community’s responsibility to assist
a state to fulfill its R2P; and
(3) the international community’s responsibility to take
timely and decisive action, in accordance with the
UN Charter, in cases where the state has manifestly
failed to protect its population from one or more of
the four crimes” [5].
While it is difficult to argue against the idea that the
international community ought to take action when gov-
ernments fail “to protect their own populations from the
four crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity” – which most often means
governments involved in genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity – we find the
present narrow scope of the ‘third wave’ of human rights
discourse deeply problematic. Others have criticized the
arbitrary application of the R2P doctrine: at times it is
applied, at times it is not, and whether it is or not may
depend more on political factors than on objective hu-
man rights assessments [6]. While we share this critique,
the one we want to develop here is of a somewhat differ-
ent nature: that the ‘third wave’ of human rights dis-
course is selective, focusing on severe violations of civil
and political human rights (we will call them political
human rights in this paper), while turning a blind eye to
gross violations of economic, social and cultural human
rights (we will call them social human rights in this
paper).
In the area of social human rights the concept of
‘Extra-Territorial Obligations (ETOs) of States in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ shares
some features with the R2P concept. The parameters of
the ETOs concept were codified in an authoritative list
by experts in international law and human rights at a
meeting convened by Maastricht University and the
International Commission of Jurists [7]. Unlike the R2P
concept, which has been “ adopted unanimously by heads
of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit
and reaffirmed twice since by the UN Security Council”
[5], the ETOs concept is still in its infancy. As we will
elaborate further below, the international community
seems rather reluctant to embrace the idea that extra-
territorial responsibility for human rights could include
social human rights as well.
To be clear, we believe in the potential merits of so-
called ‘global constitutionalism’ – in the words of Peters,
“the academic and political agenda that identifies and
advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles
in the international legal sphere in order to improve the
effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal
order” [8] – and we believe that international human
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tionalism. But we are critical proponents; we argue that if
the human rights discourse on extraterritorial responsibil-
ity remains focused on political human rights, excluding
social human rights, global constitutionalism will be “seen
purely as a liberal project whose overriding goal, though
not explicitly stated, is the imposition of Western-style lib-
eral democracy, complete with its condiments” [9].
In this paper, we elaborate three contentions:
 First, that the realization of social human rights
requires the acceptance of and compliance with
ETOs;
 Second, that compliance with ETOs would start to
shift the international assistance paradigm from
charity into legal obligation, and that this provides a
plausible explanation for the international
community’s reluctance to embrace ETOs;
 Third, that for global constitutionalism to “improve
the effectiveness and the fairness of the international
legal order” [8] – it needs to accept the indivisibility
of human rights – political and social human rights,
R2P and ETOs.
Why ETOs matter for social human rights
A comprehensive overview of all ETOs for all social hu-
man rights would not fit within a single paper. We will
discuss one particular ETO for one particular social
right: the obligation to provide international assistance
for the realization of the right to health. This is not to
suggest that the right to health is the most important so-
cial human right; it is one that allows us to illustrate the
deadly consequences of rejecting ETOs. And this is not
to suggest that providing international assistance is a
sufficient condition for the realization of the right to
health; it is but one of the essential conditions, at least
in some countries.
The basic argument is straightforward: if a health sys-
tem able to deliver essential healthcare services costs at
least US$55 per person per year, at least some low in-
come countries cannot afford that, even if they tried
hard. But if high-income countries would allocate the
equivalent of 0.1% of their gross domestic product
(GDP) to international assistance for health, in addition
to low and middle income countries making progress to-
wards allocating at least 5% of GDP to public health ex-
penditure, then essential healthcare services could be
delivered in all countries [10].
Like many other international human rights scholars,
we consider the text of article 2 (1) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as
an acceptance of an ETO to provide international assist-
ance. We agree with Tobin when he writes that thisETO has “a solid textual foundation under article 2(1)”,
but also when he writes that “the scope and the nature
of this obligation remain contested” [11]. Although the
textual foundation is solid, the accountability mecha-
nisms are weak; governments of high income countries
cannot be brought before an international court for not
living up to their ETOs. As long as these governments
refuse to live up to these duties in practice, any confirm-
ation that they have accepted them in theory will remain
controversial.
Another foundation of the ETO to provide assistance
is the promise high income countries made in 1970, to
allocate the equivalent of 0.7% of their GDP to official
development assistance (ODA) [12]. ODA is not exclu-
sively intended to realize social human rights, but it is
“administered with the promotion of the economic de-
velopment and welfare of developing countries as its
main objective” [12], and thus we can qualify the com-
mitment to allocate the equivalent of 0.7% of GDP to
ODA as an acceptance of the ETO to provide assistance.
Furthermore, as Khalfan argues, “[The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] does
not give any guidance as to the proportions of resources
available for the [International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights] that a State must utilise for
territorial and extraterritorial obligations, respectively”
[13]. And he continues arguing that in addition to a
‘process criterion’ (a fair and honest assessment of a
state’s ability to fulfil social human rights extraterrito-
rially), three substantive criteria could be used, namely
“whether a State has achieved internationally agreed
benchmarks and unilateral commitments”, “whether steps
taken are reasonable in comparison to peer States”, and
“whether the State has progressively increased the extent
of its assistance and cooperation as its available resources
increase” [13]. We would argue that the 0.7% of GDP
norm is such an ‘internationally agreed benchmark’, and
that allocating 15% of ODA (or 0.1% of GDP of high in-
come countries) is ‘reasonable in comparison to peer
States’.
One could argue that the international community is
de facto living up to its ETO to provide assistance, with-
out explicitly acknowledging the ETO. After all, many
countries made progress in the realization of the right to
health, long before acknowledging the right to health ex-
plicitly. Perhaps this is what the international community
is doing: complying with its ETO to provide assistance,
without acknowledging it explicitly. But this is problem-
atic for a number of reasons.
First, ODA that is not based on an acknowledged ETO
creates a donor and recipient relationship, rather than a
duty-bearer and rights-holder relationship. As the former
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health expressed
it: “if there is no legal obligation underpinning the human
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operation, inescapably all international assistance and co-
operation is based fundamentally upon charity. While
such a position might have been tenable 100 years ago, it
is unacceptable in the twenty-first century” [14].
Second, ODA that is based essentially upon charity is
unreliable. Foster observes that “donor disbursement
performance remains volatile and unreliable”, and that
“governments are therefore understandably reluctant to
take the risk of relying on increased aid to finance the
necessary scaling up of public expenditure” [15]. As a re-
sult, public health policies for low income countries are
generally based on the assumption that funding for re-
current expenditure should not be based on ODA. This
is the main reason why, for example, Marseille and col-
leagues argued that HIV prevention should be given pri-
ority over AIDS treatment [16], or why Costello and
colleagues challenged the strategy to reduce maternal
mortality that was based on increasing access to basic
emergency obstetric care in health centers [17].
Third, complying with an ETO – even partially – with-
out acknowledging the ETO can be perceived as rejecting
the ETO. This explains why, in 1990 – at the beginning of
the ‘third wave’ of human rights discourse – Mahbubani –
then a Singaporean diplomat in Washington DC, now
Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy of the
National University of Singapore – described how many
citizens of poorer countries felt about Western preoccupa-
tion with select human rights [18]:
“They are like hungry and diseased passengers on a
leaky, overcrowded boat that is about to drift into
treacherous waters, in which many of them will
perish. The captain of the boat is often harsh,
sometimes fairly and sometimes not. On the river
banks stand a group of affluent, well-fed, and
well-intentioned onlookers. As soon as those onlookers
witness a passenger being flogged or imprisoned or
even deprived of his right to speak, they board the ship
to intervene, protecting the passengers from the
captain. But those passengers remain hungry and
diseased. As soon as they try to swim to the banks into
the arms of their benefactors, they are firmly returned
to the boat, their primary sufferings unabated.”
The return of an old division
Soon after agreeing the UDHR [1], the ramping up of the
Cold War saw the corpus of human rights cleaved in two.
The West championed political human rights; the former
Eastern Bloc and the Non-Aligned Movement cham-
pioned social human rights. Each part was further elabo-
rated in a separate treaty: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights [19], and the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [20].This division goes back to an older division of rights
into ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights. Negative rights, entail
duties to refrain from doing something, i.e. for, freedom
of expression the main corresponding duty for society is
to not interfere when a person wants to express her or
his opinion. The right to health is considered a positive
right, because the corresponding duty for society is to
make efforts to protect or promote a person’s health.
This is the main reason why some scholars argued that
only civil human rights – considered negative rights –
could be ‘real’ human rights. Cranston, for example, ar-
gued [21], page 66:
“The traditional ‘political and civil rights’ can
(as I have said) be readily secured by legislation;
and generally they can be secured by fairly simple
legislation. Since those rights are for the most part
rights against government interference with a man’s
activities, a large part of the legislation needed has to
do no more than restrain the government’s own
executive arm. This is no longer the case when we
turn to ‘the right to work’, ‘the right to social security’
and so forth. For a government to provide social
security it needs to do more than make laws; it
has to have access to great capital wealth, and many
governments in the world today are still poor.”
The weakness of the logic underpinning this rigid div-
ision is readily apparent; for example, our freedom to ex-
press our opinions in this paper may depend on public
positive efforts like protection against aggression from
people who disagree with our opinions, while our right
to health may depend on public negative efforts like pre-
venting the burning of toxic waste. Furthermore, as
many eminent scholars have argued before us, freedom
of expression can be quite meaningless for people who
are starving [2], while people living in societies where
freedom of expression is limited may be at higher risk of
famines and starvation [22].
If the “separation wall” between political and social hu-
man rights has been deconstructed in human rights dis-
course at the national level [23], it still stands firmly
when it comes to extraterritorial obligations: R2P is ac-
cepted by the UN General Assembly, ETOs are not, and
most high income countries reject them [11].
Human rights have assumed a prominent role in inter-
national relations, but that is truer for political human
rights [24] than for social human rights [25]. This is sur-
prising if we compare article 2(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with its mirror
article in the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights. With regards to political human
rights, states made a commitment to “respect and to en-
sure them to all individuals within its territory and
Ooms and Hammonds International Journal for Equity in Health 2014, 13:68 Page 5 of 6
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/13/1/68subject to its jurisdiction” [19], whereas, with regards to
social human rights, states made a commitment to
realize them progressively, “individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially eco-
nomic and technical, to the maximum of their available
resources” [20]. One would expect international relations
to focus on social human rights, for which the corre-
sponding duties are explicitly shared – in the language
of the treaty. The origins of the division between political
and social human rights may explain the focus on political
human rights in international relations. For political hu-
man rights, with their corresponding duties considered to
be negative and therefore free of costs, international co-
operation can be expected to be limited to telling other
governments what they ought to do, while for social hu-
man rights, with their corresponding duties considered to
be positive and therefore costly, international cooperation
required financial assistance.
Global constitutionalism: the ‘imposition of western-style
liberal democracy’ or ‘minimal decency’?
If the promise of global constitutionalism – “to improve
the effectiveness and the fairness of the international
legal order” [8] – is to be fulfilled, global constitutional-
ism’s proponents will have to consider the enormous
health inequalities between so-called ‘developed’ and
‘developing’ countries. For example, Amouzou and col-
leagues recently found approximately 6.6 million under-
five deaths in 2007 in the 67 developing countries they
analyzed, and that “this could be reduced to only
600,000 deaths if these countries had the same under-
five mortality rate as developed countries” [26], but also
that “ if the under-five mortality rate was lowered to the
rate among the top 10% economic group in each of
these countries, under-five deaths would be reduced to
3.7 million” [26]. In our opinion, both the inequality
within developing countries and between developed and
developing countries constitute human rights violations.
An international legal order that does not qualify them
as such is neither fair nor effective.
In a recent paper, Frenk and colleagues argue that “the
moment is ripe to revisit the idea of global health”, and
their revised idea of global health would be based on “a
shared commitment to realisation of health as a human
right based on a recognition of our common humanity”
[27]. We could not agree more, except in as much as the
title of their paper – “From sovereignty to solidarity: a
renewed concept of global health for an era of complex
interdependence” – may suggest a complete departure
from national sovereignty. To be sure, that is not what
they imply; what they do imply looks very similar to the
notion of ‘conditional sovereignty’ as advanced by Shue:
“The basic idea is that states should have to behave with
minimal decency if they want respect. Sovereigntyshould be conditional upon performance, and perform-
ance should be judged by international norms: condi-
tional sovereignty, judged by minimum international
standards, including the provision of protection for basic
rights” (emphasis in original) [2], pages 174–175.
Taking ETOs seriously would affect the sovereignty of
all countries: for example, high income countries would
no longer be free to decide themselves how much assist-
ance they would provide to which countries; some kind
of coordination and accountability mechanism, agreed
following extensive negotiation, would provide guidance.
But this minimal limitation on sovereignty would be in
line with ‘minimal decency’, considering the lives at
stake, and the relatively modest effort required. A global
constitutionalism project that is similarly demanding for
all countries – and that ensures at the very least universal
health coverage anchored in the right to health [28] –
would have a much greater chance of succeeding than one
that is perceived as the imposition of Western-style liberal
democracy.
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